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Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krsti Decision
and the Language of the Unspeakable
Katherine G. Southwick t
In August 2001, a trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) handed down the tribunal's first genocide conviction.
In this landmark case, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti6, the trial chamber determined
that the 1995 Srebrenica massacres-in which Bosnian Serb forces executed 7,000-
8,000 Bosnian Muslim men-constituted genocide. This Note acknowledges the
need for a dramatic expression of moral outrage at the most terrible massacre in
Europe since the Second World War. However, this Note also challenges the
genocide finding. By excluding consideration of the perpetrators' motives for
killing the men, such as seeking to eliminate a military threat, the Krsti6 chamber's
method for finding specific intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in
part, was incomplete. The chamber also loosely construed other terms in the
genocide definition, untenably broadening the meaning and application of the
crime. The chamber's interpretation of genocide in turn has problematic
implications for the tribunal, enforcement of international humanitarian law, and
historical accuracy. Thus highlighting instances where inquiry into motives may
be relevant to genocide determinations, this Note ultimately argues for preserving
distinctions between genocide and crimes against humanity, while simultaneously
expanding the legal obligation to act to mass crimes that lack proof of genocidal
intent.
t B.A., Yale College, 2000. J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2005. This Note originated in a
seminar taught by Judge Patricia Wald at Yale Law School. Based on experience as a judge at
the Yugoslav tribunal in the Hague, Judge Wald's comments were invaluable. I also
acknowledge the helpful insights of Professor W. Michael Reisman, Dr. Kelly Askin, Ethel
Higonnet, Sandra Kiapi, Epaminontas Triantafilou, Daniel Walfish, and my parents. I am
particularly grateful to Joseph Blocher, Paul Breloff, and the rest of the Yale Human Rights &
Development Law Journal Edit Team for their excellent comments and professionalism. All
errors and omissions are my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Even those unfamiliar with the conflict that consumed the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s have heard of Srebrenica. If nothing else, the word
"Srebrenica" carries a pall of tragedy. Uttered with a mixture of historical
import and regret, it has become a euphemism for unspeakable events.
Only a court of law could provide the detachment necessary to
examine the facts of what occurred near the small town in southeastern
Bosnia-Herzegovina in July 1995. The United Nations Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in 1993 to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the region since 1991.1 In an August 2001 decision,
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti6, one of the tribunal's three trial chambers set
forth a comprehensive account of the tragedy. The chamber found that
following the takeover of the town, Bosnian Serb forces executed between
7,000 and 8,000 military-aged Bosnian Muslim men.2 In addition, the Serb
forces transported away from the area nearly all the Bosnian Muslim
women, children, and elderly Finding that these actions resulted in "the
physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica,"
4
the trial chamber concluded that the Serb forces had committed genocide.
For his involvement in the killings, Radislav Krsti6, the Serb officer on trial,
was sentenced to forty-six years imprisonment, one of the longest
sentences imposed by the tribunal,5 though the ICTY Appeals Chamber
reduced the sentence to thirty-five years in April 2004.6 Although the
Genocide Convention came into force in 1948, this was the first-ever
conviction by the ICTY for "the crime of crimes."7 On April 19, 2004, the
1. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217thmtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).




5. Krsti6's sentence was the longest imposed by the ICTY up until July 2003, when another
trial chamber sentenced Milomir Staki6 to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity
(extermination and persecution) and violations of the laws of war (murder). Prosecutor v.
Milomir Staki4, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 253 (July 31, 2003).
6. The appeals chamber decreased Krsti6's sentence to thirty-five years after determining
that Krsti6 aided and abetted genocide rather than having functioned as a co-perpetrator, as
originally determined by the Trial Chamber. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-
A, Appeal Judgment, 266 and 275 (Apr. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Krsti6, Appeal Judgment].
7. Genocide was first identified as "the crime of crimes" in a 1998 case before the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (CTR). Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No.
ICTR 97-23-S, Trial Judgment and Sentence, 16 (Sept. 4, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. George
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgment and Sentence, 451 (Dec. 6, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Trial Sentence, 15 (Feb. 2, 1999). The
Krsti6 appeals chamber noted that "[a]mong the grievous crimes this Tribunal has the duty to
punish, the crime of genocide is singled out for special condemnation and opprobrium ... This
is a crime against all humankind, its harm being felt not only by the group being targeted for
destruction, but by all of humanity." Krsti4, Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, 36. The first
conviction for genocide by an international court was handed down on September 2, 1998,
when an ICTR trial chamber found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide and crimes against
humanity. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 734
2005]
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ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed the trial chamber's finding that genocide
occurred at Srebrenica.'
This Note concerns a court's effort to find words to confer meaning on
unspeakable events. Naming the crimes and ascertaining criminal
responsibility, as the Krstit trial chamber was tasked to do,9 are important
to allaying some of the survivors' enduring anguish and expressing
international moral outrage. This process also seeks to generate legal
precedent that will guide future conduct in war. As Judge Patricia Wald, a
former ICTY judge, states, "It is only by accretion of case law interpreting
ambiguous parts of treaties or 'customary law' that coherent, consistent
and predictable norms of international humanitarian law are established
that can govern the future behavior of leaders in war time."0 By applying
words to the unspeakable, to "events [that] ... defy description in their
horror,"11 the Krsti6 decision, like all cases at the ICTY, sought to render
justice to the victims, create precedent to deter similar events, and promote
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. 2
On close examination, however, the Krsti6 decision is problematic,
suggesting that the good intentions behind prosecuting crimes of mass
violence should be subject to certain constraints. While the conviction of
Krstit himself invites a thorough study,13 this Note primarily seeks to
examine the court's legal finding that the Srebrenica massacres constituted
genocide. This Note proposes that the trial chamber's application of
genocide to the events at Srebrenica, while plausibly consistent with some
aspects of genocide law, was flawed.
According to the International Law Commission, "the distinguishing
(Sept. 2, 1998).
8. Krsti6, Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, 38. While the appeals chamber acknowledged
that the trial chamber "used imprecise language" and "should have expressed its reasoning
more carefully" in some parts of its analysis, the appeals chamber nonetheless agreed with the
trial chamber's finding that the Srebrenica massacres constituted genocide. Id. R1 22 & 38. It
reached this holding on the basis that the "Trial Chamber based [its] conclusion on a number
of factual findings, which must be accepted as long as a reasonable Trial Chamber could have
arrived at the same conclusions." Id. 26. Since the appeals chamber's view on the genocide
finding largely reaffirms the factual findings and legal analysis of the trial chamber, this Note
will focus primarily on the trial chamber's reasoning. Where appropriate, appeals chamber
analyses are discussed in the interests of further clarification.
9. Krsti6, supra note 2, 2.
10. Patricia M. Wald, Trying War Crimes in International Courts, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 278,
284 (2003). Judge Wald, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, served as a judge at the ICTY from 1999-2001. She also served on
the panel of three judges for the Krsti case.
11. Krsti6, supra note 2, 2.
12. The ICTY's mission is defined on the tribunal's official website, The ICTY at a Glance,
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last visited May 3, 2005). The tribunal's
additional objective is "to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law." Id.
13. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, General Radislav Krsti: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEo. J.
LEGAL EnnHcs 445, 445 (2003) (asking "does it offend basic notions of justice to convict and
imprison a middle-level officer of war crimes while his superior-the principal offender-
walks free because the court has no authority to secure the arrest of the top leader?").
[Vol. 8
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characteristic" 14 of the crime of genocide is the element of specific intent,
which requires that certain acts be "committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."15
By excluding consideration of the perpetrators' motives for killing the
military-aged men, such as seeking to eliminate a military threat as the
defense alleged, the Krsti6 chamber's standard for establishing specific
intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part, was incomplete.
In addition, stretching the meaning of certain terms in the definition, such
as a group "in part" and "destroy," also suggests a misapplication of the
word "genocide." In effect, adopting an interpretation of genocide that
cannot and will not be universally applied, the chamber untenably
broadened the meaning of the term. To the extent that this landmark
finding influences modern interpretations of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, this Note proposes that limiting the finding to
crimes against humanity-thus maintaining clearer distinctions between
these sets of crimes-would have better served the authority of the
international tribunal, the development of international humanitarian law,
and the capacity of other states to comprehend and respond effectively to
future instances of mass violence.
This Note is divided into five parts. Based on the factual findings of the
trial chamber, the second Part contains a background description of the
Yugoslav war and events leading up to the takeover of the southeastern
Bosnian town of Srebrenica. The third Part critically analyzes the chamber's
application of Article 4 to the events in Srebrenica in July 1995, arguing that
the chamber's reasoning problematically distorts the meanings of intent, a
group "in part," and "destroy" in the genocide definition. The fourth Part
develops the implications of the genocide finding in Krsti6 for the
international tribunal, humanitarian law, the security policies of
international organizations and foreign governments, and broader
concepts related to the nature of suffering and historical accuracy. Finally,
in the fifth Part, this Note argues for a more restricted application of the
genocide definition so as to preserve distinctions between genocide and
crimes against humanity, thus encouraging standards of interpretation that
may be more universally and fairly applied. Simultaneously, a legal
obligation to act should be expanded to crimes against humanity. These
distinctions, along with expanded obligations, will best serve the practical
and principled goals of international criminal and humanitarian law.
14. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 87, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
15. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 4(2), annexed to
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 808,
U.N. GAOR, May 19, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1193-97 [hereinafter
ICTY Statute]. The ICTY Statute mirrors Articles II and III of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by U.N. Gen. Assembly Dec. 9,
1948, S. Treaty Doc. No. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 78 U.N.T.S. 277,280 (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
2005]
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II. BACKGROUND OF EVENTS AT SREBRENICA
In order to assess the chamber's application of law to the Srebrenica
atrocities, it is important to situate the takeover of Srebrenica within the
Yugoslav conflict. The war involved the breakup of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which existed from 1945 until 1990. During this
half-century, Yugoslavia was made up of six republics: Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Bosnia), Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia. While one ethnic group predominated in most of these
republics-the Slovenes in Slovenia, the Croats in Croatia, and the Serbs in
Serbia, for instance-Bosnia was distinctly multi-ethnic. Before the 1990s
war, the republic was forty-four percent Muslim, thirty-one percent Serb,
and seventeen percent Croat.16 Though Muslims, Serbs, and Croats are all
ethnic Slavs, their religious and cultural differences, in addition to
historical periods of inter-group strife (one of the most bitter of which came
to pass during the Second World War 18), have served to reinforce separate
group identities.
The forty years of relative stability created by Marshal Tito's emphasis
on state unity 9 began to crumble in the late 1980s, when an economic crisis,
combined with the general decline of Eastern European communism,
intensified nationalism and subsequent separatism among the republics,
especially in Serbia, prompting other republics to declare independence. In
spite of international recognition of the Yugoslav republics' newly drawn
borders in 1991 and 1992, a struggle for territorial control ensued among
the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in Bosnia. Fighting was particularly fierce
between the Bosnian Serb forces (VRS) and the Army of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (ABiH) in the eastern part of the republic, close to Serbia.2
Srebrenica sits in the Central Podrinje region of eastern Bosnia, just
fifteen kilometers from the Serbian border. This was an area of significant
strategic importance for the Bosnian Serbs, who sought "to eliminate the
Drina River as a border between 'Serb states.' 2 1 As a military expert for the
16. Krsti6, supra note 2, 7 (citing Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion
and Judgment, 1 56-57 (May 7, 1997) [hereinafter Tadid]).
17. Tadi6, supra note 16, 56.
18. See id. 61-63. From 1941 to 1945, during Axis occupation, "[t]hree distinct Yugoslav
forces each fought one another: the Ustasha forces of the strongly nationalist Croatian State,
supported by the Axis powers, the Chetniks, who were Serb nationalist and monarchist
forces, and the Partisans, a largely communist and Serb group." Id. 61. Muslims fought
alongside both the Ustashas and the Partisans. The two Serb groups, the Chetniks and the
Partisans, also opposed the German and Italian armies of occupation. Much of the fighting, in
addition to violence against civilians, took place in Bosnia. While the Partisans killed
prominent Muslims and Croats, the Ustashas of Croatia essentially engaged in an ethnic
cleansing campaign against the Serbs in the Croatia-Bosnia border region. In 1941, some
estimate that as many as a quarter million Serbs were killed. After the Croatian puppet army's
surrender to the Allies, Marshal Tito of the Serb Partisans came to power and executed up to
100,000 Croatian soldiers.
19. Id. 66. See also Krsti6, supra note 2, 8.
20. Krstid, supra note 2, 10.
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defense stated during the Krsti6 trial, "Without the area of Central Podrinje,
there would be no Republic Srpska, there would be no territorial integrity
of Serb ethnic minorities; instead the Serb population would be forced to
accept the so-called enclave status in their ethnic territories.""0 In order to
take over areas for the Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serbs pursued a
process of "ethnic cleansing," using military means to force non-Serb
populations to flee.3
Throughout the course of fighting between ABiH forces and the VRS,
the Srebrenica enclave "was never linked to the main area of Bosnian-held
land in the west and remained a vulnerable island amid Serb-controlled
territory."24 In January 1993, in response to a Muslim attack on a Serb
village, the Bosnian Serbs severed the link between Srebrenica and Zepa, a
Muslim-held town south of Srebrenica, and thus dramatically reduced the
Srebrenica enclave to 150 square kilometers. As rural Muslims sought
refuge in Srebrenica town, the population swelled to as many as 60,000
people from its usual 37,000.2
In spite of a U.N. Security Council resolution declaring that "all parties
and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a 'safe area' that should
be free from armed attack or any other hostile act," 26 both parties violated
the safe area agreement negotiated with the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR), as the Bosnian Serbs disallowed international aid convoys
into the enclave and ABiH soldiers refused to disarm.' The chamber also
noted that "some ABiH soldiers [in Srebrenica] carried old hunting rifles or
no weapons at all and few had proper uniforms."8 In addition, while 1,000
to 2,000 VRS soldiers were deployed around the enclave, the ABiH soldiers
outnumbered the Serbs and regularly carried out reconnaissance and
sabotage activities against the Serb forces. 9 Despite these hostilities, the
enclave was relatively stable for two years.
In the spring of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs planned to attack Srebrenica
definitively. Radovan Karadzi6, President of Republika Srpska, issued a
directive to the VRS forces to "complete the physical separation of
Srebrenica from Zepa as soon as possible, preventing even communication
between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought out
combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with
22. Id. (quoting General Radovan Radinovi6). The "Republika Srpska" refers to the
separate political entity Bosnian Serb deputies of the Bosnian Parliament sought to establish
following the Bosnian republic's declaration of sovereignty in October 1991. Tadi6, supra note
16, 78.
23. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The
Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 42, 19, U.N. Doc. A/54/549, Nov.
15, 1999 [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report]. See also Krstid, supra note 2, R 562.
24. Krsti6, supra note 2,1 13 (citing Secretary-General's Report, 133-38).
25. Id. 114 (citing Secretary-General's Report, 37).
26. Id. 1 18 (citing U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/819 (1993)).
27. Id. 122-23.
28. Id. 121.
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no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica." 31 This
was an order to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica. Citing a Prosecution exhibit,
the court suggested that the order was a reaction by Karadzid to
international pressure to end the war and negotiate a peace agreement:
32
He sought to take the area while he still had time, before an agreement
could be reached. In response to the Bosnian Serb capture of an observation
post on May 31, 1995, Bosnian Muslim soldiers attacked a Serb village in
late June.3 This helped provide an excuse for the Bosnian Serb takeover of
Srebrenica.
While the VRS soldiers closed in on the town, assistance to ABiH forces
in the area from the Bosnian Muslim military and political authorities in
Sarajevo was not forthcoming. By July 11, 20,000 to 25,000 residents had
sought refuge at the U.N. compound at Potocari outside the town.
Spreading terror through threats, rapes, and killings, the VRS soldiers
compelled thousands of women, children, and elderly to board buses
transferring them out of the enclave. From the morning of July 12, the
soldiers held the military-aged men in separate locations. Some were killed
in Potocari, while most were bused to detention sites.3 On the evening of
July 11, word spread through the community that "able-bodied men
should take to the woods" so as to avoid death at the hands of the Bosnian
Serbs 5.3 A column of 10,000 to 15,000 men was formed and began marching
towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory in the north. The VRS soon
captured about one third of the column, comprising several thousand men.
Some captives were killed immediately in summary executions, but most
were put on buses going to detention sites.m
Nearly all the men captured following the take-over of Srebrenica were
executed. As the trial chamber recounted:
Most of the mass executions followed a well-established
pattern. The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses.
After being detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto
buses or trucks and taken to another site for execution. Usually, the
execution fields were in isolated locations. The prisoners were
unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimise
resistance, such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind
their backs with ligatures or removing their shoes. Once at the
killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups,
lined up, and shot. Those who survived the initial round of gunfire
were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes
only after they had been left to suffer for a time. Immediately
afterwards, and sometimes even during the executions, earth
31. Id. 28 (citing Prosecution exhibit 425, at 10).
32. Id.
33. Id. U 30 (citing Secretary-General's Report, 225).
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moving equipment arrived, and the bodies were buried, either in
the spot where they were killed or in another nearby location.1
7
Forensic evidence suggests that the victims were connected to
Srebrenica and that the majority were killed in mass executions rather than
combat. Approximately 17% of the bodies were between thirteen to
twenty-four years old and 83% were more than twenty-five years of age."
The chamber found that the total number executed was probably between
7,000 and 8,000 men.39
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENOCIDE FINDING
Among its legal findings, the trial chamber determined that the
executions at Srebrenica constituted genocide. In order to reach this
finding, the chamber had to accept that the atrocities were committed with
the specific intent set down in Article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute, which
mirrors the definition in the Genocide Convention.' This section of the
article states:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, or
religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.41
The chamber found specific intent to destroy part of the Bosnian
Muslim group because "[t]he Bosnian Serb forces knew, by the time they
decided to kill all of the military aged men, that the combination of those
killings with the forcible transfer of the women, children, and elderly
would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian
Muslim population at Srebrenica."' The chamber further found that "the
Bosnian Serb forces effectively destroyed the community of the Bosnian
Muslims in Srebrenica as such and eliminated all likelihood that it could
37. Id. 68.
38. Id. 74.
39. Krstid, supra note 2, 84.
40. Genocide Convention, supra note 15, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
41. ICTY Statute, supra note 15, art. 4(2), 32 I.L.M at 1172-73.
42. Krsti6, supra note 2, 595.
2005]
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ever re-establish itself on that territory.", 3 The chamber concluded that
these observations brought the Serb activities within the meaning of Article
4 of the Statute: Genocide had indeed taken place.
While the Krsti opinion appears detailed and considered, the
chamber's conclusion as to genocide is problematic. The defense put
forward substantial evidence that reasonably characterized the Srebrenica
massacres not as genocide, but as a heinous effort to remove a military
threat in one of the conflict's most hotly contested regions. As this Note
demonstrates, the chamber reached its questionable conclusion because it
applied an overly broad standard of intent. The chamber's analytical
approach to intent is flawed in two ways. First, the chamber's factual
determinations were based on an insufficiently rigorous examination of the
defense's arguments concerning the VRS forces' intent in killing the men.
More specifically, the chamber did not give adequate consideration to the
possible motives underlying the executions. Second, as the defense
asserted on appeal," the chamber was too expansive in its interpretation of
certain terms in the genocide definition, excessively broadening the
circumstances under which genocidal intent may be inferred.
A. The Specific Intent Standard
The most significant point of disagreement between the defense and
the chamber concerns the intent of the VRS forces in killing the military-
aged men. The defense and the chamber appear to arrive at dissimilar
findings of intent because they employ different standards. Stressing
underlying reasons or motives for the executions, the defense seems to
adopt a high standard of intent, whereas the chamber, relying almost
exclusively on what the Serb forces must have known and thought
regarding the consequences of the killings, applies a substantially lower
standard of intent. Using a more fact-intensive approach, "[tihe Defence
contend[ed] that the . .. VRS forces intended to kill solely all potential
fighters in order to eliminate any future military threat."45 Furthermore:
According to the Defence, had the VRS actually intended to
destroy the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica, it would
have killed all the women and children, who were powerless and
already under its control, rather than undertaking the time and
manpower consuming task of searching out and eliminating the
43. Id. 1597.
44. See Krstid, Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, 5 (summarizing the defense's "two-fold"
contentions that "the Trial Chamber's definition of the part of the national group [Krstid] was
found to have intended to destroy was unacceptably narrow" and that "the Trial Chamber
erroneously enlarged the term 'destroy' in the prohibition of genocide to include the
geographical displacement of a community").
45. Krstid, supra note 2, 593.
[Vol. 8
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men of the column.'
The chamber, however, seemed to avoid examining motives, endorsing
the prosecution's view "that the murder of all the military aged men would
constitute a selective genocide, as the VRS knew that their death would
inevitably result in the destruction of the Muslim community of Srebrenica
as such."47 In the chamber's final analysis:
The Bosnian Serb forces could not have failed to know, by the time
they decided to kill all the men, that this selective destruction of
the group would have a lasting impact upon the entire group ...
The Bosnian Serb forces knew, by the time they decided to kill all
of the military aged men, that the combination of those killings
with the forcible transfer of the women, children and elderly
would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the
Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica ....
By killing all the military aged men, the Bosnian Serb forces
effectively destroyed the community of the Bosnian Muslims in
Srebrenica as such and eliminated all likelihood that it could ever
re-establish itself on that territory .....
The Chamber concludes that the intent to kill all the Bosnian
Muslim men of military age in Srebrenica constitutes an intent to
destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within the meaning of
Article 4 and therefore must be qualified as a genocide.49
Essentially, while the defense limited the Bosnian Serbs' intent in
killing the men to the elimination of a military threat, the chamber
construed the selective destruction of the men to reflect a broader intent to
destroy in part the Bosnian Muslims. For the purposes of Article 4, the
court found the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica to form "part of the
protected group," ' the Bosnian Muslims. Thus, according to the tribunal,
by destroying the military-aged men, the VRS intended to destroy the
community of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, which constituted part
of the Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.
1. The Debate over Motive
Prior to proceeding with a critique of the chamber's analysis, it is
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. 11 595,597 (referring to testimony of Witness Halilovk).
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important to examine the uncertainty of the role of motive in the specific
intent required for a genocide finding. As in domestic criminal law
systems, motive and intent are distinct concepts. Concisely stated,
"[s]everal individuals may intend to commit the crime, but for different
motives.",5 Intent "explains what is being attempted without asking
why." 2 While there is no consensus on the extent to which motive should
be considered in a genocide determination, it is arguable that academic and
judicial inclinations actually tend to lean against incorporating motive into
the definition of genocide. 53 As this Note aims in part to show, this
tendency is problematic for some genocide determinations.
William Schabas, a noted scholar on international humanitarian law,
points out that while "[t]here is no explicit reference to motive in... the
Genocide Convention [from which Article 4(2) of the ICTY statute is
derived] ... the words 'as such' are meant to express the concept." 4 C6dile
Tournaye agrees, finding that without the element of motive, "the term 'as
such' would otherwise have no meaning."55 The lack of clear reference to
motive in the Convention partially reflects the fact that "[d]omestic
criminal law systems rarely require proof of motive, in addition to proof of
intent, as an element of the offence."5 6 However, omitting reference to
motive was hotly debated in the drafting committees of the Genocide
Convention. Some countries, like Norway, supported the view that "'it was
the fact of destruction which was vital, whereas motives were difficult to
determine.'5 7 On the other hand, many other delegates, "conced[ing] that
under common law, motive is generally irrelevant to guilt... argued that
genocide was a special case." 5 According to the Czech delegate, it would
be "a grave mistake to omit the statement of motives, as the nature of the
crime which it was intended to punish would be obscured."59 For Egypt,
eliminating reference to motive "would mean losing sight of the basic
51. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRiMES 245
(2000).
52. Id. at 246.
53. Id. at 251-252; see also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACcOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROcITIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 36
(1997) (stating that "most commentators agree that so long as the requisite intent is
established, underlying motives are irrelevant").
54. SCHABAS, supra note 51.
55. C~cile Toumaye, Genocidal Intent Before the ICTY, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 447,451 (2003).
56. SCHABAS, supra note 51.
57. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 69th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (1948),
quoted in SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 248. Other countries that protested reference to motive
included the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Panama, and Brazil. See id. at 4-8, 11.
58. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 249.
59. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 76th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (1946). The
Czech delegate further added that "the object... was to define genocide dearly and
precisely." Id. at 14. Without reference to motive, "the scope of the Convention would...
become too broad so that perfectly legal situations might be covered by it." Id. Noting the
total nature of modem war, New Zealand observed that "there might be bombing which
might destroy whole groups. If the motives for genocide were not listed in the Convention,
such bombing might be called a crime of genocide; but that would obviously be untrue. It
was, therefore, essential to include the enumeration of motives for genocide." U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm., 3rd Sess., 75th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (1948).
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conception of genocide." 60 While not present at these debates, it is
noteworthy that Raphael Lemkin, the international jurist who created the
word "genocide," expressly mentions motive: "Would mass murder be an
adequate name for such a phenomenon? We think not, since it does not
connote the motivation of the crime, especially when the motivation is
based upon racial, national or religious considerations."
6 1
The Venezuelan delegate introduced the phrase "as such" as
compromise text where motives could be implicitly rather than overtly
included.62 When put to a vote, the committee chair noted that "[the
phrase's] interpretation would be a matter for the several Governments
when ratifying and applying the convention."6 The meaning of "as such,"
or the extent to which motive should form part of the genocide definition,
thus seems to remain open to interpretation' and helps explain why the
defense and the chamber in Krstie appear to employ different standards of
intent.
Applying well-established rules of treaty interpretation, which only
secondarily depend on the drafting history,' the Krsti6 chamber could
conceivably have paid limited attention to motive and employed a
common standard of intent in a genocide determination. In part because
60. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 72nd mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C/.6/SR.72 (1948).
61. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide, 15 AM. SCHOLAR 227, 227 (1946).
62. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 76th mtg. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.75 (1946).
Venezuela stated that the amendment "should give satisfaction to those who wished to retain
an enumeration of motives; indeed, the latter were implicitly included in the words 'as such."'
Id.
63. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 77th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.77 (1946).
64. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 251-253 (citing NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION 60-61 (1949)). But see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 53, at 36:
While the travaux are not entirely clear, it appears that a majority of the
Sixth Committee interpreted the Venezuelan amendment either as
eliminating any motive requirement or as implying a non-limitative
description of motives. Under either view, the practical effect of the
amendment would be to eliminate the need to establish a particular
motive as an element of genocide.
Ratner and Abrams' conclusion that motive need not be established is a stretch considering
that most states did not want to reject all reference to motive. Moreover, Ratner and Abrams
note that "[tihe line between intent, a relevant factor, and motive, an irrelevant one, may...
prove thin in practice." Id. at 42 (distinguishing between the intent to rape "solely as an act of
vengeance or hostility toward the victim" and the intent to rape "as part of an effort to drive
members of the victim's group into conditions which the attacker hopes will lead to their
deaths" and identifying the latter as an example of genocidal intent). See also Toumaye, supra
note 55, at 451 (citing the International Law Commission's Fourth Report on the Draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which in 1986, "characterize[d] genocide
as a form of crime against humanity and presents 'the motive, ie, the intention to harm a
person or group of persons because of race, nationality, religion or political opinions' as the
characteristic common to all crimes against humanity").
65. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 340. Article 31 provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose." Under Article 32, the "preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion" are supplementary means of interpretation and are to be
consulted when interpretation according to Article 31 "[1leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure" or "[1]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
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the Genocide Convention does not explicitly include motive, the "ordinary
meaning"" of certain terms in the convention "in light of [the treaty's]
object and purpose" 67 is rather imprecise, and the drafting history does
not supply definitive guidance. Neither does the ICTY's own
jurisprudence. The suggestion in Jelisi6, for example, to "infer [genocide]
from a number of facts and circumstances" 69 is rather open-ended.
However, upon further examination, the chamber's method of
reasoning in this case, by excluding considerations of motive, has strange
and potentially negative consequences. To the extent that such results are
inconsistent with the aims of the interpretive principles in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 7 then the Krsti opinions are
unsatisfactory, and an alternative, more workable understanding of intent
for the crime of genocide must be identified and applied.
2. Problems with Excluding Motive
As mentioned, in finding specific intent, the chamber emphasized the
consequences of the killings. But this is inadequate, for if findings of intent
were based solely on results, then the interpretations of both the chamber
and the defense would be plausible. Pursuant to the chamber's view, yes,
the military-aged men who were executed were part of the Bosnian
Muslim group; yes, they were destroyed; and yes, the community of
Srebrenica, as it was in 1995, has ceased to exist.
On the other hand, as the defense pointed out, rather than killing the
women, children, and elderly, the VRS transported them to other areas. By
killing military-aged men-potential combatants-the VRS made certain
that Srebrenica could not be defended and would remain "cleansed."
Given that the consequences seem to sustain both characterizations of the
facts, neither the chamber nor the defense can prove intent exclusively on
these results. As Schabas points out, "[tihe crime of genocide does not
require a result, and courts need not determine whether the actual method
66. Id. art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
67. Id.
68. For example, two interpretations could be drawn from the "ordinary meaning" of
"destroy a national, ethnical, or religious group, as such." On the one hand, including the
modifiers "national, ethnical, or religious" to describe the group could suggest that "the
attempt to destroy" be based on such discriminatory grounds. On the other hand, the
modifiers could merely serve to delineate the characteristics members of the group must share
in order for their destruction to qualify as genocide. The Krsti6 chamber appears to take this
latter approach. In terms of the treaty's "object and purpose," ambiguity over the role of
motive in turn creates uncertainty as to whether or not the convention specifically seeks to
condemn discrimination (in which case motive is significant) or if its goal is to preserve
national, ethnic, and religious diversity (in which case motive would seem less critical).
69. Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 47 (July 5,
2001) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Jelisi6, Appeal Judgment]; see also Rutaganda v
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 528 (May 26, 2003) (cited in
Krsti6, Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, 34).
70. See supra note 65, art. 32(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
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was well chosen."71 Put slightly differently, the fact that certain results
came about does not necessarily prove that those results were intended
when certain acts were committed. More evidentiary analysis may be
required,2 in addition to clarification of terminology used to characterize
the acts' consequences.
While the chamber's approach is flawed in its dependence on results to
show intent, its stress on what the VRS forces must have known about the
impact of the killings on the general Srebrenica community is also thorny.
Relying on the testimony of social science experts,' the chamber asserts
that "the Bosnian Serb forces had to be aware of the catastrophic impact
that the disappearance of two or three generations of men would have on
the survival of a traditionally patriarchal society." 74 More specifically, the
chamber interprets the mass executions' "lasting impact on the entire
group" to have "effectively destroyed" the Srebrenica Muslims.'
However, what the Bosnian Serb forces knew about Bosnian Muslim
societal structure is arguably incidental. Even if they knew that executing
the men would have a lasting impact, it does not necessarily mean that
such knowledge formed the basis of the perpetrators' intent, especially
when considered in conjunction with the fact that conscious steps were
taken to preserve the rest of the community by bussing its members to
safer areas. Through this reasoning, the chamber is effectively equating
knowledge, a lower level of intent, with purpose, the highest standard of
intent, which, as Cecile Tournaye points out, inheres in genocide's intent
requirements.76
Given that patriarchal structures are common to many societies,
knowledge of the impact of the men's elimination is almost too obvious
and facile an assertion. Killing any man who has dependents, for whatever
reason, would likely have a lasting impact on his dependents. As the
71. William A. Schabas, Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judgments
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 23, 47
(2001).
72. In a discussion of mens rea in criminal law, William Schabas observes that:
Criminal law presumes that an individual intends the consequences of his
or her acts, in effect deducing the existence of the mens rea from proof of
the physical act itself... But the material act may not provide enough
information to enable a court to conclude that the intent is specific, and
not merely general. For example, if a victim is killed by an automobile, in
the absence of other elements the likely conclusion will be that it was an
'accident'. . ..If the prosecution intends to prove that killing by an
automobile is intentional, or even premeditated, considerably more
evidence of intent is required.
SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 222.
73. Wald, supra note 10.
74. Krsti6, supra note 2, 595.
75. Id. 597. See also supra note 44.
76. Tournaye, supra note 55, at 450 (citing Jelisid, Appeal Judgment, supra note 69, t 46,
which states that "specific intent requires that the perpetrator... seeks to achieve the
destruction, in whole or in part of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" and
Krstic, supra note 2, 561, which states that "[m]ere knowledge of the victims' membership in
a distinct group on the part of the perpetrators is not sufficient to establish an intention to
destroy the group as such").
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defense argued, "these consequences would remain the same, regardless of
the intent underlying the killings and thus 'do not contribute to deciding
and determining what the true intent of the killing was.' ' 77 This is not to
suggest that inquiring into the nature of societal structures is irrelevant to
ascertaining genocidal intent; far from it. It is merely to assert that, in some
cases, particularly where the victims are both male and potential
combatants in an armed conflict, such an inquiry should not be as
dispositive as it appears to be in Krstit.
3. The Intent to Eliminate a Military Threat
This reasoning applies to the military context, strengthening the
defense's characterization of the intent to eliminate a military threat. When
a soldier kills another in combat, the soldier who kills does not necessarily
intend to have a "lasting impact" on the family of the deceased soldier
even if the combatant may assume that such an outcome would result. If
there were such intent to affect the family of the soldier who is killed, that
intent is presumably secondary to the intent to defeat the enemy.
Similarly, one cannot assume that the killing of the military-aged men
was necessarily or primarily intended to afflict the rest of the Srebrenica
community even if the perpetrators were aware of such a result. In the
context of an armed conflict over territory, it is logical to infer that the most
immediate goal is to weaken or eliminate the military opponent. At the
Nuremberg trials, American General Telford Taylor used a similar
argument: "Berlin, London and Tokyo were not bombed because their
inhabitants were German, English or Japanese, but because they were
enemy strongholds."78 While contrary to the laws of war, summarily
executing all potential combatants could be viewed as an efficient tactic for
achieving the primary objective to defeat an "enemy stronghold" like
Srebrenica. William Schabas seems to suggest this analysis in his
observation that:
[T]he Prosecutor's contention that the intent in killing the men and
boys of military age was to eliminate the community as a whole...
seems a rather enormous deduction to make on the basis that men
and boys of military age were massacred. Can there not be other
plausible explanations for the destruction of 7,000 men and boys in
Srebrenica? Could they not have been targeted precisely because
they were of military age, and thus actual or potential
combatants?7 9
77. Krsti6, supra note 2, 593.
78. Leo Kuper, Theoretical Issues Relating to Genocide: Uses and Abuses, in GENOCIDE:
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 31, 33 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994) (internal
citations omitted).
79. Schabas, supra note 71, at 46.
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It is important to note that all these characterizations of the VRS forces'
"true intent" by both the defense and Schabas actually relate to the Bosnian
Serbs' motives. They suggest that without inquiring into motives in an
effort to find specific intent, the chamber's deductive reasoning based on
the perpetrators' presumed knowledge of consequences, particularly when
those consequences are not likely to bring about further physical
destruction, is potentially too sweeping.
Indeed, the defense countered the genocide claim by building a case
for alternative motives underlying the killings. The defense assembled facts
to "prove that the VRS forces intended to kill solely all potential fighters in
order to eliminate any future military threat."' ° For instance, "[t]he
wounded men were spared. More significantly, 3,000 members of the
column were let through after a general truce was concluded between the
warring parties."8 With respect to the claim that the VRS forces sought to
destroy the Srebrenica community, the defense "points to the fact that the
VRS forces did not kill the women, children, and elderly gathered at
Potocari but transported them safely to Kladanj, as opposed to all other
genocides in modem history, which have indiscriminately targeted men,
women, and children."'
Schabas props up this analysis in asking, "Would someone truly bent
upon the physical destruction of a group, and cold-blooded enough to
murder more than 7,000 defenseless men and boys, go to the trouble of
organizing transport so that women, children, and the elderly could be
evacuated?"3 If the alleged purpose was to destroy the group, transporting
the women, children, and elderly to more secure areas does seem
counterintuitive. The allegation that the Bosnian Serb forces intended
physical destruction of the group might be stronger if the forces had
simply abandoned the women and children, but this too may depend on
other factual findings.
Other facts to which the chamber refers lend support to the Bosnian
Serb forces' perception of the Bosnian Muslim men as a military threat.
First, in the years prior to the takeover, ABiH soldiers outnumbered the
Bosnian Serb forces in the area and regularly engaged in sabotage activities
against them." The chamber relates that "on the evening of July 11, 1995,
word spread through the Bosnian Muslim community that the able-bodied
men should take to the woods, form a column together with members of
the 280' Division of the ABiH and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian
Muslim-held territory."' While it may be true that "the young men were
afraid they would be killed if they fell into Bosnian Serb hands in
Potocari," these facts also carry military connotations that the chamber
80. Krstid, supra note 2, 593 (citing defense closing arguments).
81. Id. -1593.
82. Id.
83. Schabas, supra note 71, at 46.
84. See supra note 29.
85. Krsti6, supra note 2, I 60.
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seems to ignore.86 The term "able-bodied" is often used to describe men
capable of military service, though of course it may also have been
employed to refer to those men who were merely able to march in a
column; that is, those who were not wounded or sick. While the column
may have been conceived as a method by which ABiH soldiers would
protect civilian men as they escorted them to safety, the formation of a
column, let alone a "breakthrough," sounds like a military maneuver.
The chamber consistently refers to the fact that Bosnian Serb forces
failed to distinguish Bosnian Muslim soldiers from civilian men, but as the
chamber also relates, the 28th Division of ABiH that remained in the
enclave was disorganized. Many members of the 28th Division that
remained in the enclave lacked weapons and "few had proper uniforms."
8 7
In light of these facts, if the Bosnian Serb forces were not at times confused
as to which men were soldiers and which were not, there was some reason
for them to suspect that most able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men could be
combatants.
The chamber's consistent use of the term "military-aged" to describe
the men also betrays an implicit understanding on the part of the chamber
that the men could have participated in armed resistance, that they were in
fact potential combatants. Of course, international law prohibits the
targeting of civilians in conflict, such as "[plersons taking no active part in
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms."88 Recognizing that the executed men could easily be perceived as
potential combatants, if not actual combatants, is thus not intended to
expiate the VRS of having committed a horrendous atrocity. Rather, in
suggesting that the VRS forces' motives were related primarily to the
achievement of limited military objectives, the observation is intended to
cast doubt on the VRS's genocidal intent to destroy the Srebrenica Muslims
by killing the military-aged men.8 9
It is also important to highlight that nowhere is the allegation
challenged that "[tlhe offensive against the safe area aimed to ethnically
cleanse the Bosnian Muslims" from the region." The point over which the
chamber and the defense differ concerns whether or not in pursuing that
objective by killing the military-aged men, the VRS intended to destroy the
Bosnian Muslims in part-and thereby commit genocide-or if the VRS's
intent was restricted to taking the territory by ensuring the permanent
removal of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica to another area. In the
context of ethnic cleansing, both characterizations comprise ethnic hatred
of the other group. The question thus raised by the divergent views of the
chamber and the defense concerns when ethnic cleansing, which may
86. Id.
87. See supra note 28.
88. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug.
12, 1949, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 137 [hereinafter GPW].
89. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 254 (stating "where the defense can raise a doubt about the
existence of a motive, it will have cast a large shadow of uncertainty as to the existence of
genocidal intent").
90. Schabas, supra note 79, at 45-46 (quoting Krsti6, supra note 2, 592).
[Vol. 8
17
Southwick: Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krsti Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
Srebrenica as Genocide?
comprise war crimes and crimes against humanity, may also constitute
genocide.9
Though the defense pointed out the chamber's difficulties in
establishing genocidal intent, such as over-reliance on the outcome of the
takeover and Bosnian Serb forces' potential awareness of the effect of the
men's disappearance on the community, and in spite of substantial
evidence supporting the Bosnian Serbs' perception of the Srebrenica men
as a military threat, the chamber persisted in finding that genocidal intent
underlay the mass executions. The chamber responded:
Granted, only the men of military age were systematically
massacred, but it is significant that these massacres occurred at a
time when the forcible transfer of the rest of the Bosnian Muslim
population was well under way. The Bosnian Serb forces could not
have failed to know, by the time they decided to kill all the men,
that this selective destruction of the group would have a lasting
impact upon the entire group.92
Even if both the characterizations of the defense and the chamber seem
plausible, ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence do not supply clear guidance on
what to do when different inferences may be derived from facts
surrounding the same events. Under such circumstances, discretion is
ultimately left to the judges. When evidence contradicts or casts doubt on
certain inferences, as the evidence put forward by Krsti6's defense does, a
court applying a standard of reasonable doubt should shy away from
incrimination.
The opinion itself suggests that the defense is not required to prove the
perpetrators' actual intent in order to counter a genocide daim. It merely
has to establish a reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb forces' intent in
killing the military-aged men was genocidal.93 This also seems consonant
with what one scholar identifies as "the well-established principle[] ... of
giving criminal defendants the benefit of the doubt in cases where the
applicable law is unclear." 94 Instead, ambiguity in genocide's intent
requirement, and a general sense that motives are not significant to a
genocide determination, enable the chamber to avoid directly addressing
the defense's arguments and reaffirm its initial approach. According to the
Krsti6 appeals chamber, "as long as a reasonable Trial Chamber could have
arrived at the same conclusions," based "on a number of factual findings,"
the trial chamber's determination "must be accepted."95 As far as intent is
91. Tournaye, supra note 55, at 447.
92. Krsti6, supra note 2, 595.
93. Id. 593 (referring to Defense conclusion that "there is no proof and evidence upon
which this Trial Chamber could conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that the killings were
carried out with the intent to destroy").
94. David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the
International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 231, 276 (2002).
95. Krsti6, Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, 26.
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concerned, the trial chamber's conclusion of genocide is arguably
reasonable in light of the legal definition's ambiguities, but according to
certain basic principles of legal interpretation, and as a matter of common
sense, it is not.
B. Definitional Ambiguities
The second way in which the chamber's approach is flawed concerns
the liberties the chamber took with other ambiguous elements of the
genocide definition. The effect of this approach is to broaden the set of
circumstances from which genocidal intent may be inferred.
1. "In Part"
One of the thorny elements of the genocide definition relates to the
meaning of a group "in part." The court reasonably rejected the
prosecution's attempt to define the targeted group as the "Bosnian Muslim
population of Srebrenica."96 The chamber recognized that "[a] group's
cultural, religious, ethnical or national characteristics must be identified
within the socio-historic context which it inhabits." 97 Thus, in order to
define the targeted group, the chamber looked for "the stigmatisation of
the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its
perceived ... ethnical.., or religious characteristics. '" 9' Not only did the
1963 Yugoslav Constitution recognize the Bosnian Muslims as a "nation," it
is clear that "the highest Bosnian Serb political authorities and the Bosnian
Serb forces operating in Srebrenica in July 1995 viewed the Bosnian
Muslims as a specific national group."99 The chamber observed that "[tihe
only distinctive criterion would be [the Srebrenica Bosnian Muslims']
geographical location, not a criterion contemplated by the [Genocide]
Convention." 10' The chamber thus "conclude[d] that the protected group,
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Statute, must be defined... as the
Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica... constitute a part
of the protected group under Article 4."101
This reasoning is sound, but in the course of applying the finding that
the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica represent part of a protected group, the
court stretched the genocide definition in a problematic way. The chamber
concluded that by killing the Bosnian Muslim men of military age, or part
of the Muslim population at Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb forces intended to
destroy the Srebrenica Muslims, part of the Bosnian Muslim group. The
96. Krsti6, supra note 2, 91 558.
97. Id. 557.
98. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Nikolid, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant
to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 27 (Oct. 20, 1995) and Prosecutor v.
Jelisik, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 70 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Jelisi6I).
99. Id. 559.
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court effectively stated that destroying part of a part of a group constitutes
genocide. In so doing, the chamber seemed to echo reasoning from other
ICTY jurisprudence, which suggests that targeting certain, significant
segments of a group may constitute genocide. In Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, the
trial chamber stated that genocidal intent may manifest in "the desired
destruction of a more limited number of persons selected for the impact
that their disappearance would have upon the survival of the group as
such."1° This view was also put forward in a report by the Commission of
Experts, which the Security Council established in 1992 to investigate
violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. The
Commission reported:
If essentially the total leadership of a group is targeted, it could
also amount to genocide. Such leadership includes political and
administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and
intellectuals, business leaders and others-the totality per se may
be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers
killed. The character of the attack on the leadership must be
viewed in the context of what happened to the rest of the group. If
a group has its leadership exterminated and, at the same time or in
the wake of that, has a relatively large number of the group
members killed or subjected to other heinous acts (for example,
deported on a large scale or forced to flee) the cluster of violations
ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the
provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its
purpose.10
The Commission went on to report that, "[s]imilarly, the extermination
of a group's law enforcement and military personnel may be a significant
section of a group in that it renders the group at large defenceless against
other abuses of a similar or other nature, particularly if the leadership is
being eliminated as well."1" Though the Expert Report stresses the
significance of the group's leadership, it also increases the scope of the
definition to include military personnel as a segment of the population
significant enough to qualify for genocide, assuming the fate of the rest of
the group involved other heinous acts. The Expert Report thus appears to
buttress the Krsti chamber's analysis and conclusion of genocide at
Srebrenica.
However, support from the Expert Report is of limited use since its
reasoning is problematic and not wholly consistent with ICTY
jurisprudence. First of all, events at Srebrenica are not consistent with the
report's formulations, since while military-aged men were killed, "the vast
102. Jefisid, supra note 98, 82.
103. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
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majority of Muslim men who were of political or military importance in
the.., enclave successfully evaded capture [since] ... as is so often the case
in war, a person's importance . . . provided the best assurance of
survival."" 5 Leaders captured on both sides were exchanged. 10 6 In
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, where killings at a concentration camp were at issue,
the chamber observed that the "[victims] do not appear to have been
persons with any special significance to their community, except to the
extent that some of them were of military age, and therefore could be
called up for military service." 1 7 For the Sikirica chamber, the common
characteristic of military age was insufficient to constitute a significant
segment because the number of victims was "limited" 108 and participation
in armed resistance does not necessarily merit treatment as a community
leader."° As the chamber said, "[a]cceptance of that submission would
necessarily involve a definition of leadership so elastic as to be
meaningless.""0 The chamber thus rejected the genocide charge. In
stressing that the numbers were "limited," the chamber faintly suggested
that killing larger numbers of potential combatants may qualify as a
significant segment because it would have a "significant impact on the
survival of the Muslim population.""' However, the chamber tempered
this suggestion by stating that men of military age cannot all qualify as
leaders. Sikirica thus creates some confusion as to when or whether
military-aged men may count as a significant segment for a genocide
determination.
This confusion is not surprising, for there are other problems with both
the category of military-aged men and the significant segment approach
more generally for genocide determinations. First, as suggested in the
Expert Report, killing military-aged men would impact the survival of the
community those men might be called to defend. But to include military-
aged men in the set of segments of society that may be considered for a
genocide finding would be inconsistent with the fact that destroying
defenses, including military personnel (or those suspected of participating
in the military), is inherent to warfare. While killing soldiers under certain
circumstances in war is certainly criminal,"' identifying as genocide the
killing of men who may serve a military function treads too unrealistically
on natural expectations of war. Can a military officer be expected to engage
105. JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR CRIME 58
(1996).
106. Id.
107. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defense Motions to Acquit, I
80 (Sept. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica].
108. Id. '181.
109. Id; see also Schabas, supra note 71, at 45.
110. Sikirica, supra note 107, 81.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88; GPW, supra note 88, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 135-137.
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in conflict if there is a concern that the killing of some combatants could be
construed as genocide?
Schabas points out a second reason why the Sikirica chamber may have
rejected military-aged men as a significant segment. Specifically, the
"significant segment" argument itself is flawed because it could result in
rather arbitrary "value judgments about how important one or another
group may be to the survival of the community."" 3 Women and children
could arguably be a more logical target than community leaders or military
aged men if the objective is to prevent the physical continuation of the
group. Targeting community leaders and military-aged men may be a
brutal means to the more restricted end of defeating the enemy and
subduing it so that it will abide by a certain policy. Such objectives fall
short of genocide. Moreover, preserving the lives of women and children
could suggest that the enemy is operating under the assumption that the
targeted group will live on.
A third flaw in the "significant segment" approach is that, by accepting
that the destruction of a part of a part of a group may constitute genocide,
it employs a logic that could stretch indefinitely. Say, for instance, that the
Bosnian Serb forces only executed military leaders, but the chamber found
that this act destroyed the remaining men's capacity to defend and care for
their community, which in turn led to the population being forcibly
transferred and never able to return to that territory, or carry out their way
of life. Would this hypothetical destruction of a part of a part of a part of a
group be genocide? The notion is hard to swallow. It dilutes the meaning
of genocide.
2. "Destroy"
In addition to stretching the meaning of a "group, in part," the Krsti6
chamber problematically stretched the meaning of "destroy" in the
genocide definition. Tournaye observes that "ICTY judgments have
consistently found that the destruction referred to under the Genocide
Convention only covers a physical or biological destruction.", 4 The Krsti6
decision was among those that upheld this view,1 15 citing the International
113. Schabas, supra note 71, at 45.
114. Tournaye, supra note 55, at 454 (citing Krstid, supra note 2, 580; Jelisid, supra note 98,
78-83; Sikirica, supra note 107, 9J 63-86).
115. Krsti6, supra note 2, 1 580 ("[C]ustomary international law limits the definition of
genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the
group."). The trial chamber was careful to indicate, however, that it reached this conclusion
"with due regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege." Id. Recent developments,
according to the tribunal, suggest a more liberal view of the meaning of "destroy." Id. n 577-
580. A 1993 General Assembly resolution, for instance, identified ethnic cleansing as a form of
genocide. Id. 1 578 (referring to U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 143, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/121 (1993)). The notion of destroy as implied by Raphael Lemkin, the originator of
the word "genocide," also seems more open-ended. He writes, "genocide does not necessarily
mean the immediate destruction of a nation.... It is intended rather to signify a coordinated
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves." RAPHAEL LEMIN, Axis
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Law Commission's analysis that "[a]s clearly shown by the preparatory
work for the Convention, the destruction in question is the material
destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the
destruction of the national, linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of
a particular group."".6 This is consistent with the Eichmann case, where the
District Court of Jerusalem distinguished between the Nazis' forcing Jews
to flee and the "sense of total extermination" embraced by the Final
Solution in 1941.11?
While most of the men of Srebrenica were physically destroyed, the
women, children, elderly, and wounded men survived. In concluding that
genocide had occurred, the chamber thus viewed the destruction of the
Srebrenica Muslims in a figurative sense, apparently contradicting its
affirmation of the literal meaning of "destroy." The Prosecution stated that
"what remains of the Srebrenica community survives in many cases only in
the biological sense, nothing more. It's a community in despair.., it's a
community that's a shadow of what it once was.""8 Summarizing the
destruction of the Srebrenica community, the chamber stated:
[T]he elimination of virtually all the men has made it almost
impossible for the Bosnian Muslim women who survived the take-
over of Srebrenica to successfully re-establish their lives.... [They]
have been forced to live in collective and makeshift
accommodations for many years.... [The] vast majority of Bosnian
Muslim refugees [and adolescent survivors] have been unable to
find employment."9
In addition, the women continue to live with the trauma of their
experience and the denial of "closure that comes from knowing with
certainty what has happened to their family members." 2' The chamber also
implies destruction of the community in asserting that the Bosnian Serb
forces "eliminated all likelihood that [the community of Bosnian Muslims
in Srebrenica] could ever re-establish itself on that territory."' Thus, for
the chamber, the Srebrenica Muslims were destroyed in a metaphorical
sense.
In addition to recognizing how the events at Srebrenica have
RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944). According to this definition, ethnic cleansing is not
necessarily the same as genocide if the main purpose is to move a population elsewhere rather
than annihilate the group. Even with this broader view, Lemkin suggests that the acts must
ultimately be directed towards the physical or biological destruction of the group or part of
the group.
116. Krsti6, supra note 2, I 576 (citing International Law Commission Draft Code, at 90-
91).
117. A-G Israel v. Eichmann (1961), in 36 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 18, 104 (E.
Lauterpacht ed., 1968).
118. Krsti4, supra note 2, 592.
119. Id. 9191.
120. Id. 93 (citing testimony of Jasna Zecivic, Director of Vive Zene, a non-governmental
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devastated the community, the chamber likens the fate of the survivors to
physical destruction through certain turns of phrase. Instead of the events
at Srebrenica leading to the physical destruction of the group, the chamber
declares that the events resulted in the "physical disappearance of the
Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica.'12 Similarly, use of the phrase
"effectively destroyed" rather than the more direct and unmodified
"destroyed" suggests an implicit acknowledgement by the chamber of its
figurative approach to the meaning of "destroy." The chamber's
description of families as having been "dismembered and irreparably
rent"123 also captures the ambiguity between physical and metaphorical
destruction. Using subtle language, the chamber interprets the
consequences of the Srebrenica massacres to fit a notion of "destroy" which
Article 4(2) debatably embodies.
C. Summary
In summary, the chamber's reasoning in finding genocide has two
problems. First, in excluding considerations of motive, the chamber's
interpretation of facts to infer genocidal intent was overly selective since
the facts as set forth by the defense presented a plausible alternative for the
Bosnian Serb forces' underlying intent. Instead of seeking to destroy part of
the Bosnian Muslims in killing the military-aged men of Srebrenica, the
VRS may have primarily sought to eliminate a military threat in a hotly
contested region. The transfer of the remaining inhabitants of Srebrenica
may be viewed as part of a plan to remove one ethnic population and take
over the area, but not to commit genocide.
The second problem in the chamber's reasoning relates to the way in
which the chamber stretched the meaning of specific wording in Article
4(2). As shown, the meaning of a group "in part" does not permit us to
conclude that the destruction of a "part of a part of a group" constitutes
genocide. Related to this, the chamber also conveys that a group need not
be physically destroyed to be "effectively destroyed." Through such broad
reasoning, the chamber has promoted a problematic interpretation of
genocide.
Problems with the chamber's approach suggest that in some cases,
particularly those concerning efforts to destroy part of a group,
ascertaining genocidal intent cannot be entirely divorced from inquiring
into motives. Where a set of acts and their consequences may reasonably
lead to a range of inferences and explanations, the exercise of determining
genocidal intent should be subject to considerable rigor, perhaps requiring
evaluation of further evidence and deeper examination of the parties'
application of terminology. In cases where fewer facts challenge the
inference of intent to physically destroy part or all of a protected group,
inquiring into motives or ascertaining a discriminatory basis, may be less
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important. Such an approach to genocide's intent requirement is
responsive to the Genocide Convention's dual aim to condemn ethnic and
religious discrimination and to preserve ethnic and religious diversity.1
24
IV. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SREBRENICA AS GENOCIDE
As the ICTY's first genocide conviction, the Krstit decision and the
chamber's broad interpretation of genocide have significant implications
for the international tribunal, for the development of international
humanitarian law, and ultimately, for the willingness and capacity of
foreign entities to prevent or mitigate mass violence. While some of these
implications may be based on good intentions, this Part seeks mainly to
highlight the potentially negative implications of the Krsti6 chamber's
broad approach to genocide.
A. Implications for the ICTY
With respect to the reputation of the tribunal, an expansive view of the
genocide definition may seem advantageous initially, but such a view
might ultimately disserve the tribunal. On the one hand, the Krsti6 decision
enables the ICTY to fulfill a "historic mission"25 to prosecute the crime of
genocide.126 The conviction may be seen as the culmination of efforts over
four decades (since the creation of the Genocide Convention) to establish
an international court to prosecute serious violations of humanitarian
law.1 27  The tribunal may tout the genocide conviction as an
accomplishment, as a way of satisfying the expectations generated by the
media and international organizations during and soon after the war in the
124. See supra note 68; see also Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The
Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2265 (arguing for a
knowledge-based interpretation of genocidal intent so as to cover groups that fall "prey to
discriminatory extermination in a campaign of persecution that lacks a clear objective to
destroy the group in its collective sense"). Without endorsing Greenawalt's approach
wholesale, his analysis lends support to the notion that a motive inquiry would be less
important in cases involving the (threat of) physical destruction of a protected group on a
large scale or of a significant proportion of that group. Such cases blur distinctions between
knowledge and purpose to destroy.
125. See William Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1034 (2003). Schabas writes:
[I]f it cannot be established that [Slobodan Milosevic,] the man who ruled
Yugoslavia throughout its decade of war did not actually intend to
commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but only that
he failed to supervise his subordinates or joined with accomplices when a
reasonable person would have foreseen the types of atrocities they might
commit, we may well ask whether the Tribunal will have fulfilled its
historic mission.
126. See Schabas, supra note 71, at 23.
127. Id. at 24 (stating that "[e]fforts to create... an international tribunal [to try persons
charged with genocide] were launched immediately [in 1948] by the General Assembly, but
nothing substantial came of them for more than four decades").
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former Yugoslavia."" In the words of one former ICTY judge:
What has the Tribunal accomplished in its nine years?... [S]everal
other high-ranking military and civic leaders accused of war
crimes or crimes against humanity... have been apprehended or
voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal. These include General
Radislav Krsti6, Commander of the Drina Corp[s,] who has been
found guilty of genocide in the Srebrenica massacres of up to 8,000
young Muslim men. ' 9
A genocide conviction for a tragedy of Srebrenica's magnitude helps
establish the tribunal as an institution that has fulfilled its promise to
express the international community's moral outrage at the atrocities that
transpired in the former Yugoslavia during the early to mid-1990s.
Commenting on the Krstie case, one expert observer of the ICTY from the
Coalition for International Justice remarked that "[glenocide is different
from any other crime. For many surviving Bosnian Muslims, anything less
than a genocide conviction could feel like a slap in the face. " 130 In addition,
a genocide conviction may be viewed as the international community's
implicit apology to the victims for its lack of action to prevent the
massacres. Aryeh Neier, President of the Open Society Institute, affirms
that "the nations of the world that failed to act responsibly and effectively
to stop genocide as it was taking place in Bosnia and Rwanda must also
accept political responsibility."1 3' Numerous other voices have reproached
the international community for failing to act to prevent or stop the
atrocities.132
128. Id. at 24-25 (noting that "popular journalistic accounts repeatedly described the
ongoing atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina as genocide" and referring, among others, to
ROY GUTMAN, A WITNESS TO GENOCIDE: THE 1993 PULITZER-PRIZE WINNING DISPATCHES ON
THE "ETHNic CLEANSING" OF BOSNIA (1993); MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED,
RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA (1996); and NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE
PoLicY OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN EASTERN EUROPE (1995)).
129. Patricia M. Wald, Trying War Crimes in International Courts, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO.
278,279-80 (2003).
130. Ashbel S. Green, Portland Lawyer Takes On Case of War Crimes, THE OREGONIAN, Dec.
26,2003, available at http://alumni.princeton.edu/-cl1954/NormSepenuk.htm.
131. Aryeh Neier, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects: Conference
Adjournment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1579, 1582-83 (1998).
132. See, e.g., Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawfulness of
NATO's Use of Military Force to Defend Kosovo, 23 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 295, 329 (1999)
(stating that the international community "failed to act early enough to stop the killings" in
Bosnia); Herman Reinhold, Target Lists: A 1923 Idea with Applications for the Future, 10 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 31 (2002) (stating that doing nothing in the face of genocide "leads to
criticism for failure to act, or failure to act sooner",> Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: Good
Samaritans and Compelling Duties, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1059, n.15 (2000); Peter
Kamerer, A Balancing Act: While the Media's Spotlight Is Focused on Iraq, One UN Official Is
Making Sure Other Issues Around the World Are Not Neglected, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 16,
2004, available at 2004 WL 79400094 (quoting Dr. Shashi Tharoor, U.N. Undersecretary-General
for Communications and Public Information, as saying that the United Nations "is not
perfect-it failed to act ... in Bosnia or the genocide in Rwanda"); David Wastell, Thatcher
Accuses West, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 6, 1995, at 2 (reporting that "Lady Thatcher
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A genocide conviction also has implications for other cases before the
tribunal and other institutions. Professor Michael Scharf points out that,
"[o]n a practical level, if the court determines that Srebrenica does not fit
the legal definition of genocide, it would be very difficult to make the
charge stick against Milosevic." 133 He goes on to state that "it is crucial that
[Milosevic] be convicted of genocide... [b]ecause if you can't convict
Milosevic, then who can you convict of genocide in the modern age?"'M For
the Iraqi war crimes tribunal, Krsti6 "will be a vitally important decision, a
vitally important doctrine of what constitutes genocide in Saddam's
case."1 3 Thus, for some international human rights activists and scholars, a
conviction for "the crime of crimes" may be seen as a triumph for the
development of international humanitarian law, especially as it increases
the extent to which the definition may be applied to other cases.
These observations suggest that the ICTY had much to gain from
characterizing Srebrenica as genocide: historic recognition, popular
approval, validation of the Bosnian Muslims' suffering, and influential
legal precedent. These gains may well serve to portray the genocide
finding in Krsti6 as an achievement, but in the process of reaching this
outcome, the Krsti6 chamber may have undermined the ICTY's credibility.
It is conceivable that the Krsti6 chamber recognized these gains prior to
the final judgment, and it is not unreasonable to wonder whether these
factors affected the chamber as it strained to interpret the events of
Srebrenica within the terms of Article 4(2). As analysis in the previous
section showed, the Krsti6 chamber appears to have heavily relied on
general consequences to prove intent, to the exclusion of considering other
plausible motives, and the chamber stretched the meaning of certain words
within the genocide definition in expansive ways. Consideration of these
pressures raises the question of the role political factors should play, if at
all, in the creation of international criminal jurisprudence. While the ICTY
should note the international community's moral outrage, the tribunal
should also strive to avoid the impression that such institutions are
susceptible to such pressures.
In other words, convicting Krsti6 for genocide (or at least, aiding and
abetting genocide, as the Appeals Chamber found) could be viewed by
some as an achievement for the prosecutors, but not for the chamber and
not for the ICTY. Rather than by its outcomes, the chamber's success must
be measured by the rigor of its legal analysis. This is the foundation of
enduring relevance and wide acceptance of the law the chamber promotes.
The Krsti6 chamber's adoption of a more restrained approach to the
has renewed her assault on the Western powers for failing to act more effectively over Bosnia,
accusing the UN, and, by implication, Britain, of 'acquiescing in genocide'"); see also Payam
Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs.
J. 229, 257 (1995) (suggesting that some may view the Yugoslav tribunal as a "mere token
response intended to absolve the civilized world of responsibility for inaction").
133. Green, supra note 130.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Robert Donia, a visiting scholar at the University of California at San
Diego who has testified for the prosecution in seven ICTY trials).
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genocide definition would have enhanced the tribunal's authority since it
would have integrated other approaches to international law, those with
potentially wider appeal to states obligated to enforce the law." From an
activist's perspective, compromising with critics can weaken the basis of
the critics' opposition and thus better serve one's goals in the long run.
Moreover, whether foreign governments accept and internalize principles
of international humanitarian law depends in part on whether ICTY
jurisprudence is sound and realistic. To the extent that reputation and
influence rest on credible authority rather than on what some might view
as desirable outcomes, decisions like Krsti6 potentially undercut the
tribunal's influence.137 In light of these pressures, the genocide conviction in
Krsti6 raises questions regarding the vulnerability of international tribunals
to extra-legal considerations.
B. Implications for International Humanitarian Law
Since the ICTY is an instrument of international humanitarian law, the
suggestion that the Krsti6 chamber's broad interpretation of Article 4(2)
may have cost the tribunal legitimacy at some level also implies certain
costs to the substance of and state adherence to international humanitarian
law. Some problems arise from the fact that the Krsti6 decision broadens
the applicability of the crime of genocide to the point where most instances
of ethnic cleansing may be construed as genocide. The Krsti6 trial chamber
is not the first entity to liken ethnic cleansing to genocide. In a separate
opinion to a preliminary decision of the International Court of Justice,
Judge Elihu Lauterpacht wrote that "forced migration of civilians, more
commonly known as 'ethnic cleansing,' is, in truth, part of a deliberate
campaign by the Serbs to eliminate Muslim control of, or presence in,
substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such being the case, it is difficult
to regard the Serbian acts as other than acts of genocide."' In a 1992
resolution, the United Nations General Assembly equated ethnic cleansing
136. See, e.g., George J. Andreopoulos, Introduction: The Calculus of Genocide, in GENOCIDE:
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 1, 9 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994)
(supporting the "intentionality criterion" and the need for a definition which sheds light on
the "feasibility of preventive measures against genocide"); Schabas, supra note 79, at 32-36, 47
(putting forward a narrow construction of genocide by suggesting that a policy or plan be an
element of the crime and asserting "a world of difference between physical destruction of a
group and 'a lasting impact' on a community"); see generally John R. Bolton, The Global
Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the Name of Utopia, 78 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, 157-164 (1999)
(highlighting general problems of accountability and politicization in international
institutions, in international criminal trials specifically).
137. See Nersessian, supra note 94, at 276 (suggesting an analogous effect by describing
certain interpretations in the Rwandan tribunal's Akayesu decision as "well-intentioned but
misguided" and asserting that "[o]ther judicial bodies hearing genocide cases certainly can
and should strike a different balance").
138. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) 1993
I.C.J. 3 (April 6) (separate reasons of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht).
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in Bosnia to genocide.'39 As Schabas points out, "[tihe view that the two
terms are equivalent or that they overlap is widely held within the
diplomatic and academic communities." 14° Yet such constructions of
genocide uneasily tread on the requirement that destruction within the
meaning of the genocide definition be physical.
The genocide interpretation in Krsti6, however, is arguably even
broader than equating ethnic cleansing with genocide. As noted in Part III,
finding that the VRS forces "could not have failed to know... that this
selective destruction of the group would have a lasting impact upon the
entire group," the chamber suggests that most mass killings could
effectively amount to genocide, since nearly all "selective destructions"
will no doubt have an enduring effect on the group and most groups will
have some sort of ethnic or national identity. Under such a construction,
the bombings of Berlin and Tokyo in World War II could conceivably
qualify as genocide, contrary to US General Telford Taylor's view."'
Divorcing the crime from national, ethnic, and religious motives risks
depriving the word of its unique expressive power in the same way that
doing so in the domestic sphere would deny hate crimes their special
significance.2
Without differentiation between genocide and ethnic cleansing, or
between genocide and other forms of killing, the risk of distortion and
relativism emerge, creating difficulties in the adherence to and
enforcement of international humanitarian law. 4' Since loose application
of the term "genocide" obstructs understanding of the dimensions of an
ongoing conflict, then international actors may be hindered in crafting
sound policy responses to the events. As George Andreopoulos asserts, "a
good definition has a critical functional value: to assist in the detection of
early signs of an impending crisis and, provided the appropriate
mechanisms are in place, devise preventive measures.
"14
139. G.A. Res. 121, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (1993) ("the
abhorrent policy of 'ethnic cleansing,' which is a form of genocide").
140. William A. Schabas, Problems of Codification: Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo
Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 287, 294 (2001).
141. See supra note 78.
142. See infra note 159.
143. Along these lines, Tournaye highlights the "rule of effectiveness," which, as stated by
one ICTY chamber, "is an elementary rule of interpretation that one should not construe a
provision... as if it were superfluous." Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals
Judgment, 284 (July 15, 1999). Another case asserts "the principle of 'normative economy,"'
or the notion that
a legal system cannot withstand the existence within its confines of two
concepts or rules that fulfil essentially the same function or bear
divergently on any one situation. The [ICTY should] assume the
responsibility for the further rationalization of these categories [e. g.,
genocide and crimes against humanity] ... from the perspective of the
evolving international legal order.
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Judgment, at 2 (October 2, 1995) (separate
opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction). In
other words, for a rule to be effective, its definition must be unique. See Tournaye, supra note
55, at 456.
144. Andreopoulos, supra note 136, at 4 (1994). Andreopoulos further explains that
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In addition, broad applicability of the term genocide may place
countries with larger scales of mass violence (or the threat of it) at a
disadvantage, as it risks undervaluing the lives lost in those countries. It
gives the impression that the loss of 8,000 lives (as in Srebrenica) is similar
in gravity to the loss of 800,000 (as in Rwanda). Not only might this offend
countries suffering greater losses, but among the myriad factors shaping an
international response, application of the term could contribute to a
disproportionate allocation of already scarce sympathy and assistance to
countries experiencing or under threat of experiencing mass violence.
Increasing the applicability of the term "genocide" to a wide variety of
events may discourage contracting states' willingness to enforce the
Genocide Convention. One of the distinctive characteristics of the Genocide
Convention is the obligation to act. In Article I of the Convention,
contracting parties pledge to "undertake to prevent or punish" the crime.
Moreover, "[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of
acts of genocide." 46 This obligation to act reflects the contracting parties'
conviction that genocide is a crime that transcends the high bar of state
sovereignty and interest. The Genocide Convention, however, does not
specify who has the authority to determine whether or not genocide is
taking place. The question may be submitted to the International Court of
Justice,'4 but the absence of a straightforward process of determination
suggests that states will act only if there is consensus that the definition of
genocide has been amply met.
This in turn weakens the main policy argument for the Krsti6
chamber's broad approach to genocide, which maintains that increasing
the instances in which states are legally obligated to act pursuant to a
genocide determination will help induce action in situations where the
international community might otherwise stand by. This argument would
be compelling if the finding of genocidal intent in Krsti6 had been more
convincing. Will contracting parties feel compelled to act when the method
of determination involves stretching the meaning of certain words in the
Convention, particularly in ways that dilute the intent requirement and
confuse what constitutes "a quantitatively substantial part of the protected
group"? 48 The fact that the international community would not ratify the
[A] good definition can be instrumental in the creation of an early
warning system for the detection of genocide-prone situations.... [A]
proper conceptual framework should be able to explain nonevents: In
particular, it should provide insights into why genocide-prone situations
did not develop into full-scale genocides, and why societies that had
witnessed large-scale genocidal massacres in the past managed to achieve
relative stability without any structural changes in the perpetrator
regime.
Id.
145. Genocide Convention, supra note 15, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
146. Id. art. VIII, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
147. Id. art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
148. Krsti4, supra note 2, 586; see also Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-
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Convention if the crime was not defined strictly implies that the answer is
no. Therefore, identifying genocide as the chamber does in Krsti would
actually weaken the effectiveness of the Convention because states would
simply not be willing to enforce it. As Schabas observes, "enhancing the
obligations states are prepared to assume when faced with genocide, up to
and including military intervention, will never be achieved if they are
unsure about the crime's parameters." 14 Thus, strict definition of the crime
"remains the price to be paid for recognition of a positive duty to act in
order to prevent genocide."50
Furthermore, if contracting parties are unwilling or unable to act on
overly broad interpretations of genocide, the standing of those states may
be unduly tarnished, which may in turn negatively impede their
effectiveness in identifying and responding to clearer cases of genocide in
the future. Similarly, if states feel that international law will judge their
action or inaction unfairly, then state support for the rule of international
law more generally may falter.
C. Implications for the Meaning of Suffering and Historical Accuracy
Just as relativism in genocide interpretation can negatively influence
enforcement, it can also obstruct international tribunals' efforts to bring
justice to victims and establish the facts of devastating events. Specifically,
a broad approach to genocide may have negative effects on the meaning of
suffering and historical accuracy.
The problem of relativism arises in the Krsti6 chamber's figurative
interpretation of the word "destroy" in the genocide definition. By
extending the notion of "destroy" beyond physical elimination, the
chamber places itself in the awkward position of defining what it means to
survive. Taking note of the Srebrenica massacres' devastating effects on the
remaining members of the community, the court is without doubt
acknowledging their suffering which may in turn be significant to their
healing. Perversely, however, labeling the tragedy as "genocide" and
defining the surviving group as "destroyed" may stultify the living
victims' process of recovery. It also serves to weaken the survivor's
capacity to redefine his or her destiny. By adopting a figurative
interpretation of "destroy," in some sense, the chamber is effectively saying
that where there is life, there is no hope, which contradicts the connotations
of "surviving," such as prevailing or overcoming.
This figurative interpretation of "destroy" could lead to other perverse
results. Say, for instance, a similar fate befell another community, except
that the survivors-through aid, determination, or luck-managed to
95-1A-T, Judgment, 64 (June 7, 2001) ("[T]he intention to destroy must target at least a
substantial part of the group."); Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case
No. ICTR-95-I-T, Judgment and Sentence, 97 (May 21, 1999) (requiring "the intention to
destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of the group").
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rebuild their lives in some discrete yet significant ways. It could be
awkward to conclude that that community had been destroyed, for to do
so would belittle their progress. The chamber then would not necessarily
label the ordeal they had endured as genocide. The suffering endured by
the community that did not recover as well (or at least perceived to have
not recovered as well) would thus be "rewarded" with the more robust,
expressive word. This analysis also relates to perceptions of displaced and
refugee communities in other parts of the world, such as Africa, for which
international observers seem less inclined to employ the word "genocide."
Though the conditions of displacement are often worse than in Bosnia,
these communities are not typically described as "destroyed." Of course,
given the "in part" language of the genocide definition, genocide can have
survivors, but a more literal interpretation of "destroy" avoids the
difficulties of passing judgments on the status of survivors.
Still, while the suggestion that -the remaining community of Srebrenica
was destroyed as a result of deportation and the mass executions of the
men may in some way inhibit that community from helping itself, perhaps
the genocide label will encourage others to help that community: to
contribute international aid, for example. Yet the fact that such assistance
would come as a response to misleading assertions raises ethical dilemmas.
These observations on the Krsti6 chamber's figurative interpretation of
"destroy" suggest that such an approach encourages an understanding of
genocide that may perpetuate feelings related to victimization, as survivors
are effectively locked into a perception that they have been destroyed,
which may in turn prolong hostilities between rival groups.1' Contrary to
the ICTY's mission to promote reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, this
may be a tendency international humanitarian law does not wish to
advance.
The relativism brought about by rendering international crimes less
distinct, as the Krsti6 decision seems to do, also has implications for
historical truth. If the extermination of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men is
characterized in the same way as the slaughter of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis,
historical understanding of the impact of such events on their respective
ethnic groups and countries is obscured. Learning that genocide occurred
in a certain country immediately invites thoughts of massive and traumatic
devastation. However, there are numerous differences between mass
killings in the context of territorial conflict which result in the loss of 0.3
percent of a population (as in Srebrenica) and mass killings principally
motivated by ethnic hatred that result in the loss of nearly ten percent (as
in Rwanda). Since these differences are not captured in the genocide label,
151. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING GENOCIDE
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 11 (noting that "memories, or propaganda-inspired
illusions about memories, can motivate people who otherwise live peaceably to engage in
torture and slaughter of neighbors identified as members of groups who committed past
atrocities" and that "mass killings are the fruit of revenge for past harms"). Minow's analysis
of how certain constructions of the past can perpetuate violence might be applied to judicial
determinations which take expansive approaches to the definition of a crime such as genocide.
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application of the term to both sets of events obstructs an accurate
portrayal of each nation's history and the experience of its people.
Discounting such motives creates confusion in social science
scholarship, which lessens its usefulness to policy-makers. As Frank Chalk
asks, "If we include every form of war, massacre, or terrorism under
genocide, then what is it that we are studying?""2 Moreover, if a broader
approach does not go as far as Chalk imagines and still maintains some
distinctions between different forms of mass killing, the risk that those
distinctions appear to have been drawn arbitrarily increases. The effect is
twofold: It discounts those killings that did not fit the definition (for
whatever reason) and cheapens the scale and intensity of the horrors of
unmistakable genocides such as those of the Armenians, the European
Jews, and the Rwandan Tutsis.
The significance of recognizing ethnic and religious discrimination
(and arguably other forms of discrimination) as inherent in genocide is also
important to historical accuracy for the purposes of reconciliation and
political administration. Given the challenges presented in some countries
by ethnic and religious diversity, the word "genocide" forms an important
part of the vocabulary that encourages policies and practices that promote
ethnic and religious tolerance. More broadly, denying the relevance of
ethnically or religiously discriminatory motives to genocide seems
counterintuitive to attempts over the past century to eradicate
discrimination on these grounds. Of course, the language of genocide is
also important to policies responding to the destruction of protected
groups which, though not clearly based on discriminatory motives,
nonetheless brings about ethnic or religious polarization.
In their search for justice, courts are able and expected to privilege
truth. This privilege may be misused when a court applies existing law that
simply encompasses too much. The more widely a word such as
"genocide," with its powerful and specific connotations, may be applied to
a set of historical facts, the more truth is hidden. By contrast, truth is best
revealed when language is precise. Thus, in the interests of plain truth, of
being able to distinguish one nation's tragic past from another, and in light
of truth's direct connection to justice, clear distinctions between such
crimes should be preserved.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Taking the negative implications discussed in the previous Part into
account, this Part proposes an alternate view of how the Krsti6 chamber
should have characterized the massacres at Srebrenica and how genocide
law should develop. In short, the Srebrenica killings are best characterized
as crimes against humanity, and genocide should be construed more
narrowly than the approach adopted in Krsti6, so as to preserve a
152. Frank Chalk, Redefining Genocide, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL
DIMENSIONS 47, 60 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994).
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distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity. These
distinctions should be accompanied, however, by efforts to expand states'
obligations to act beyond the confines of the genocide definition.
A. Srebrenica as Crimes Against Humanity
In light of the problems the Krsti6 genocide finding creates for both law
and policy, categorizing the Srebrenica massacres as crimes against
humanity would have been more appropriate. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute
defines crimes against humanity as certain volent acts "committed in
armed conflict... and directed against any civilian population"" 3 Such
crimes include murder, extermiation, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other
inhumane acts."s Unlike genocide, in ethnically motivated crimes against
humanity or persecutions, the perpetrator "selects his victims because of
their membership in a specific community but does not necessarily seek to
destroy the community as such.""' By including persecution, yet stating
that crimes may be "directed against any civilian population," the
definition of crimes against humanity criminalizes acts committed with a
mixture of motivations.
This is similar to the intent requirement of extermination, which does
not require that the acts be committed on discriminatory grounds.' Since it
is uncertain whether the military-aged men of Srebrenica were
exterminated because they were potential combatants or because they were
members of the Bosnian Muslim group, the crimes committed fit more
easily into the category of crimes against humanity. As noted by the
International Law Commission, "where the specific intent of genocide
cannot be established, the crime may still meet the conditions of the crime
against humanity of 'persecution."''5 In addition, persecutorial intent may
be more plausible than genocidal intent since, in transferring the women,
children, and elderly, and in sparing the wounded men, it may be inferred
that the Bosnian Serb forces did not seek to destroy the group even though
the individuals may have been targeted in part by virtue of their group
membership. Indeed, both Krsti6 chambers found that the events at
Srebrenica constituted crimes against humanity under Article 5 as
persecution and extermination." By insisting on an additional genocide
153. ICTY Statute, supra note 15, art. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 1173.
154. Id. 32 I.L.M. at 1173-74.
155. Krsti6, supra note 2, 1 553 (citing Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskid, et al., Case No. IT-
95-16-T, Judgment, 1 636 (Jan. 14, 2000) and Jelisik, supra note 98, ' 79).
156. Id. [ 500 ("[E]xtermination may be retained when the crime is directed against an
entire group of individuals even though no discriminatory intent nor intention to destroy the
group as such on national, ethnical, racial or religious grounds has been demonstrated").
157. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 219 (quoting Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Comm., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
87, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996)).
158. Krstid, supra note 2, Ill 538 and 505. Consistent with the elements of extermination,
the chamber found that "a particular population was targeted and that its members were
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finding when the facts correspond so closely to crimes against humanity,
the trial and appeals chambers blurred the distinctions between the two
types of crimes.
B. Moving Forward: Maintain Hierarchy and Expand Obligation to Act
Given the problems highlighted in previous sections concerning the
Krstit chamber's application of a broad standard of intent, developments in
humanitarian law should strive to maintain a hierarchical distinction
between genocide and crimes against humanity, with genocide retaining its
status as the "crime of crimes." In order to differentiate the crimes,
genocide should require a higher standard of intent, specifically taking into
account underlying motives in certain cases, in an effort to ascertain
whether certain acts were carried out with the purpose to destroy a
national, ethnic, or religious group.159 Here the focus should be on what
Schabas has called the "collective motive,"' 6° or the aims of the planners
and organizers, rather than the "personal motive" of individual
participants, which could range from financial gain to political ambition.1
6
1
This distinction helps avoid the evidentiary obstacles of applying such a
high standard on an individual basis, a problem noted by certain
delegations during the drafting of the Convention.
162
The motive inquiry would, however, be less significant in cases where
inferences of genocidal intent may be less equivocally deduced from the
facts, circumstances, and consequences relating to a protected group's
destruction. While upholding such a hierarchy of crimes is ultimately
sensible in principle, flexibility would still be necessary in practice due to
killed or otherwise subjected to conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a
numerically significant part of the population." Id. 503. In spite of these findings, however,
the trial chamber did not enter cumulative convictions for the executions under Articles 4 and
5, finding it "impermissible to convict the accused ... of extermination and genocide based on
the same conduct." Id. 685. Genocide, being "the most specific crime," was retained. Id. The
appeals chamber nevertheless allowed the cumulative convictions, finding that elements of
extermination, persecution, and aiding and abetting genocide were "materially distinct" and
that Krstid possessed the requisite intent for each. See Krsti6, Appeal Judgment, supra note 6,
218-29.
159. In inquiring into motives, a chamber should ask whether the intent to destroy was
based on discriminatory grounds. One domestic analogy is the distinction between hate
crimes and parallel crimes not motivated by bias. Hate crimes contain a motive element in
that they must be motivated by hatred based on some group characteristic such as race,
ethnicity, or sexual preference. Some statutes enhance the penalties for hate crimes, intending
to send the message that crimes motivated by such biases are "inherently worse" and "worthy
of special punishment." David Goldberger, The Inherent Unfairness of Hate Crime Statutes, 41
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 449, 449-50 (2004). See generally FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE:
BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999).
160. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 255.
161. Id; see also Greenawalt, supra note 124, at 2288 (arguing that genocidal intent should
apply to individuals insofar as they are aware that their actions are in furtherance of a
campaign where the "manifest effect" is the destruction of a protected group in whole or in
part).
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the unique circumstances of different cases. This flexibility, however,
should not be with respect to applying the term "genocide" to a broad
range of circumstances, but with regard to recognizing an obligation to act
with less attention to how certain atrocities are labeled.
The notion of a hierarchy for genocide and crimes against humanity
may be critiqued on two related grounds. First, as mentioned earlier, there
is a policy argument for broad application of the genocide label: Because
states are obligated to act under the Convention, applying the term more
broadly may help induce action in instances where the international
community might otherwise stand by. The problem with this approach is
that seeking to legitimate a desire or sense of obligation to act cannot be the
primary determinant as to whether or not certain events constitute
genocide. As Andreopoulos points out, such labeling is "indicative of
moral outrage at the outcome, rather than of an analytical perspective on
the process." 1
The second possible critique of the notion of a hierarchy also derives
from a sense of moral disgust, specifically at what Israel Charny calls
"definitionalism," where preoccupation with precise definitions becomes
so excessive that it demeans the subject matter.165 Just as it may be offensive
to equate the massacres at Srebrenica with the Holocaust, it is equally
distasteful to suggest that some forms of mass killing are uniquely worse
than others. Accordingly, Charny proposes:
[I]nstead of expressing our dubious zeal for excluding categories of
mass deaths from the realm of genocide, we put together the whole
rotten record of all types of mass murder committed by man...
and thereby generate an even more powerful force that will
protest, intervene, and seek to reduce and prevent any and all
occurrences of mass destruction of human lives."
Charny's frustration is understandable. In the context of mass
destruction, perhaps we are dealing with crimes where the horror of the
acts and their consequences is so great that it eclipses the significance of
intent. For the purposes of practical application, however, it remains
important to retain analytical perspective, to draw distinctions for the
protection of the accused, to help ensure enforcement, and to maintain
historical accuracy. Ultimately, maintaining clarity creates the greatest
scope for saving lives.
Underlying these possible critiques of preserving a hierarchy between
genocide and crimes against humanity is the desire to instill within the
163. Andreopoulos, supra note 136, at 6.
164. Israel W. Chamy, Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL
AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 64, 91 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994). Charny defines
definitionalism as "a damaging style of intellectual inquiry based on a perverse, fetishistic
involvement with definitions to the point at which the reality of the subject under discussion
is 'lost."' Id. at 91.
165. Id. at 92.
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international community an obligation to act to prevent or stop various
forms of mass killing. The proposal for a hierarchy of crimes may
accommodate this inclination by urging that humanitarian law develop so
that the legal obligation to act is not exclusive to genocide. The current
confusion created by the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide
reflects in part one of the drawbacks of creating international treaties for
particular types of violations. Specifying situations where states are
obligated to act can in some ways diminish the impulse to act in instances
in which there is no explicit legal obligation. Where war crimes and crimes
against humanity are taking place, states may act if-pursuant to Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter-the Security Council identifies such acts as a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."' 66 Such open-
ended concepts do not lend themselves to clear and consistent
interpretation, and even where such acts are not construed as threats to
peace, action may still seem justifiable on moral, humanitarian grounds.
This elusive sense of obligation was arguably visible with respect to
events in Darfur, Sudan, where the central government in Khartoum, using
regionally based militias, sought to crush rebel groups through mass
killing, rape, and forced displacement of civilians. Similar to the killings in
Rwanda, the question underlying the debates as to whether or not the
atrocities amounted to genocide concerned the scope of the international
community's obligation to act. Currently, a conclusion of genocide would
generate a greater expectation of international action than a determination
of crimes against humanity.
With or without a genocide determination, the sense that the world
must do something in Sudan arguably remains. Just as the Genocide
Convention was created to match moral outrage with a legal obligation to
act, new legal obligations should arise as the world confronts with greater
frequency the devastating effects of various forms of conflict. Such an
approach would help liberate advocates of intervention (military or
otherwise) from the need to prove that various types of atrocities constitute
a specific form of mass killing, i.e., genocide. Similarly, states' sense of
obligation to act might actually be enhanced if public discourse on such
matters emphasized candor rather than subjective views of vaguely
worded legal definitions. Enhancing the obligation to act in response to
other crimes would not unduly diminish the distinctiveness of the crime of
genocide and it would acknowledge the inclinations of international
courts, world opinion, and some states to recognize international
obligations with respect to such forms of human destruction.
Efforts to develop other duties to act are suggested in the
comprehensive 2000 report, Responsibility to Protect, submitted to the
United Nations community by Canada's independent International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in response to the U.N.
Secretary-General's open challenge to reassess the doctrine of
166. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
[Vol. 8
37
Southwick: Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krsti Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
Srebrenica as Genocide?
humanitarian intervention.167 The report's central concern is that "sovereign
states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophe... but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.
"
'6
"Avoidable catastrophe" presumably extends beyond genocide. Of course,
the report is merely advisory and intended to serve as a precursor to more
formal development of international consensus on these issues. One
possible development could be a U.N. declaration on the "Principles of the
Responsibility to Protect," similar in approach to the Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement. Developed by international legal experts in
consultation with states and non-governmental actors, such an instrument
could be rooted in both existing law and evolving norms, yet avoid the
time-consuming tasks of drafting and ratifying a whole new international
treaty.
There are ways for courts like the ICTY to help build momentum in
this direction. A chamber should not seek to impart gravity to crimes
against humanity by straining to identify such crimes as genocide, but
could rather express the international community's outrage and enhance
international obligations through language in its opinion, strict sentences,
16
and overt encouragement of other entities to contribute to the recognition
and redress of the victims' ordeal. In addition, international advocates
should refine their ability to identify the symptoms of a looming genocide
and, on the basis of prevention, invoke the Genocide Convention's
obligation to act. Even if war crimes and crimes against humanity do not
clearly foreshadow genocide, advocates may appeal to the report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty"7 and the
U.N. Charter, which, as mentioned, can mandate action by the
international community once a threat to international stability has been
identified." While such methods may be imperfect, the effect of their
continued invocation can contribute to the progression of effective
167. Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, Foreward to the Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, at VII (2001), available at
http://www.idss.ca/report-en.asp.
168. Id. at VILf.
169. For instance, in Prosecutor v. Stakic, though the trial chamber rejected the genocide
charges, the chamber still sentenced Milomir Staki6 to life imprisonment for war crimes and
crimes against humanity. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
170. Gareth Evans, The World Should Be Ready to Intervene in Sudan Darfur, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., May 15, 2004, available at 2004 WL 77529057.
171. As outlined in the Charter, the purpose of the United Nations is to "maintain
international peace and security, and... take collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to peace." U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1. In the history of the United
Nations, "threats to peace" have included civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Mozambique, violence in East Timor, and terrorist attacks in the United States. While
genocide did not take place in these instances, alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity helped motivate concrete action on the part of the international community. For a
brief overview of U.N. efforts to address conflict, see UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF PUB. INFO.,
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international law.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the landmark Krsti6 decision, the trial chamber illustrates the
importance of words in conferring meaning on unspeakable events.
Constituting "a massacre on a scale unprecedented in Europe since the
Second World War," 72 the tragedy at Srebrenica merits a dramatic
expression of moral outrage on the part of the international community. In
characterizing the massacre of 8,000 military-aged Bosnian Muslim men as
genocide, the chamber used the most potent expression possible. However,
in order to do this, the chamber stretched the meaning of several
components of the genocide definition, declining to limit the
characterization of the events to crimes against humanity. By applying a
broad standard of intent, extending the meaning of a group "in part," and
adopting a figurative interpretation of "destroy," the trial chamber enabled
wider application of the term "genocide."
While the intentions in categorizing Srebrenica as genocide may have
been good, the finding may encourage negative tendencies in international
humanitarian law. In diluting the meaning of genocide as it does, the trial
chamber may have reduced the authority of the international tribunal and
weakened the distinctions between genocide and crimes against humanity,
consequently reducing the capacity of the word "genocide" to evoke a
unique form of devastation. This effect offends the memory of extreme
instances of genocide, affects perceptions of survivors, distorts history, and
complicates attempts to prevent or mitigate genocide through effective
policy-making. While words to describe the horrors of events like those at
Srebrenica should be powerful, to guard against the negative consequences
just described, those words should also be precise and carefully applied.
Limiting the circumstances under which the genocide label may be applied
exposes the disparity between moral outrage at horrible atrocities and an
inability to compel action. This gap can be filled through the enhancement
of international legal obligations to act in the face of mass crimes lacking
proof of genocidal intent.
Still, the effort to reveal truth and classify facts in the best, most
practical way is haunted by Charny's frank disgust at the enterprise.
Indeed, this paradox in international humanitarian law-the need to
systematize offenses set against the absurdity of differentiating the
appalling from the horrific-exposes the limits of law in doing justice to
the suffering such events cause.173 When Winston Churchill referred to the
172. Wald, supra note 13, at 445 (quoting Press Release SG/SM/7489, Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, United Nations, Srebrenica Tragedy Will Forever Haunt United Nations History,
Says Secretary-General on Fifth Anniversary of City's Fall (July 10, 1995), at
http:/ / www.un.org/News /Press/ docs / 2000 /20000710.sgsm7489.do.html).
173. See Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (Aug. 17, 1946), in HANNAH ARENDT-
KARL JASPERS CORRESPONDENCE, 1926-1969, at 51, 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., 1992)
(stating that the Nazi crimes "explode the limits of law .... For these crimes, no punishment
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Nazis' large-scale exterminations as "a crime without a name,"174 Raphael
Lemkin considered the comment an invitation to create a word. Yet
Churchill's statement also implies that such acts constitute a crime beyond
words. Rather than using words, another way to find justice for the victims
of Srebrenica, living and dead, or for the victims of any unspeakable
horror, is simply to act.
is severe enough .... That is, the guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters
any and all legal systems"); see also Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in
Context: Mediating the Global and Local in the Age of Accountability, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 721
(2003).
174. SAMA-THA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
29 n.32 (2002) (citing Winston S. Churchill, 3 THE CHURCHILL WAR PAPERS: THE EVER-
WIDENING WAR: 1941, at 1099-1106 (Martin Gilbert ed., 2000) and noting that "the line that
Lemkin found so memorable was not meant to refer to the extermination of Europe's
Jewry. . .but to the Germans" 'methodical, merciless butchery' of the Russians").
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